Computer-Generated Child Pornography--Exposing
Prejudice in Our First Amendment Jurisprudence?
When confronted with the issue of child pornography,' most
Americans find no problem with punishing those who create, sell,
distribute, or possess visual images of children engaging in sexually
explicit conduct.! Under normal circumstances, nonobscene, sexually explicit material would possess full First Amendment protection.5
Actual, living children are used to create child pornography; thus,
For the purposes of this Note, child pornography is defined as any visual depiction of an actual minor engaging in any actual or simulated, sexually explicit
conduct.
2 See SETH L. GoLorN, Tm SExuAL EXPLOITATION OF CHIDREN 10-11 (1987).
3 See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2346
(1997) (applying strict scrutiny to
legislation banning sexually explicit material from the internet); Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) ("Sexual expression which is indecent but
not obscene is protected by the First Amendment .... ."); Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 487 (1957) (emphasis in original) ("The portrayal of sex, e.g., in art, literature and scientific works, is not itself sufficient reason to deny material the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and press.").
The First Amendment states, in pertinent part, "Congress shall make no
law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press .... " U.S. CONSr. amend.
I. Although the First Amendment was originally construed to protect political and
social speech, the Court has consistently held that the First Amendment also protects artistic and other types of speech even if of a sexual nature. See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 66 (1981) (holding that nude dancing, as a
form of expression, is within the purview of protected free speech);Joseph Burstyn,
Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501-02 (1952) (holding that motion pictures, despite
being made for commercial motives, are protected by the First Amendment); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948) (holding that the distinction between
informative speech and speech for entertainment purposes is "too elusive" to deny
entertaining expression constitutional protection). Most First Amendment scholars
have explained that the Court should protect artistic and sexual expression in order
to serve the "self-fulfillment" purposes of the First Amendment. See THOMAS I.
EMERSON, Ti-tx Syrxs OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6 (1970) (declaring that the purpose of the First Amendment is to enable each individual to realize his or her
"character and potentialities as a human being"); RODNEYA. SMOLA, FREE SPEECH IN
AN OPEN Socixr 9 (1992) (claiming that free speech is not only a means to an end
but also "an end itself, an end intimately intertwined with human autonomy and
dignity"); see also Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 862 (1974) (Powell,
J., dissenting) (expressing the view that "the First Amendment protects important
values of individual expression and personal self-fulfillment"); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972) (stating that free speech is necessary "to
assure self-fulfillment for each individual").
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the government's interest in protecting children from sexual abuse
is sufficiently compelling to justify a prohibition on nonobscene materials seemingly protected by our Constitution.4 Until very recently,
the sole congressional purpose behind the prohibition of child pornography has been to prevent the harms incurred by children who
are used to create these visual materials." The use of children to create even nonobscene pornographic materials has always been
deemed a form of sexual abuse that our society refuses to tolerate.6
As it now stands, most child pornographers require actual children to pose and act in sexually explicit ways in order to create visual
images of child pornography.7 This involvement in the production
.of child pornography is what Congress has sought to prevent since
1977.8 Over the past few years, however, computer technology has
rapidly advanced, and it is now possible to create life-like images of
people. For instance, using a scanner and certain inexpensive software, a computer user can scan a picture of a child onto the com4 See, e.g., Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 108 (1990) (holding that protection

of children from sexual abuse is compelling enough to prohibit the possession of
child pornography); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756 (1982) (holding that the
protection of "the physical and psychological well-being" of the child was sufficient
tojustify a prohibition of nonobscene child pornography).
See 136 CONG. Rxc. S4729 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 1990) (statement of Sen. Thurmond) ("[Pirotecting our children from the heinous crime of sexual exploitation
must be undertaken with strong resolve.... We cannot ignore the harm to these
innocent victims as the loss to them and their families is immeasurable.').
6 See GOLDSTIIN, supra note
2, at 10-11.
See Ronald W. Adelman, The Constitutionality of Congressional Efforts to
Ban
Computer-Generated Child Pornography: A First Amendment Assessment of S. 1237, 14 J.
MARHALLJ. COMpurR & INFO. L. 483, 484 (1996). Most child pornographers will
usually seek out and approach a child who appears vulnerable with the hopes of befriending him or her and developing a close, trusting relationship with the child.
See RobertJ. Clinton, Note, Child Protection Act of 1984-Enforceable Legislation to Prevent Sexual Abuse of Children, 10 OKLA. CrlYU. L. REv. 121, 132 (1985). After a process of rewarding the child with various gifts, candy, or toys and showing the child
various types and degrees of pornography, the pedophile attempts to desensitize
the child and make him or her comfortable with the sexual nature of the relationship. See id. at 132-33. Once the offender is satisfied that the child is comfortable
and desensitized, the child is persuaded to pose for the offender's photographs or
participate in sexual activities with the adult. See id. at 133.
See H.R. REP. No. 98-536, at 1 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 492. In
its report, Congress stated:
The creation and proliferation of child pornography is no less than a
national tragedy. Each year tens of thousands of children under the
age of 18 are believed to be filmed or photographed while engaging
in sexually explicit acts for the producer's own pleasure or profit. The
Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977 was
designed to address this inexcusable abuse of children.
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puter screen and alter or "morph" the picture to make it appear that
the child is nude or engaging in sexually explicit conduct.!
In addition, computer users can create realistic, threedimensional animated images of humans that are merely figments of
the user's imagination without even scanning photographs of actual
people. ° At the present time, the components necessary to create
SSee David B. Johnson, Comment, Why the Possesion of Cmputer-Generated
Child
Pornography Can Be ConstitutionallyProhibitud, 4 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TEcH. 311, 313, 314

(1994). This process of *morphing," stemming from the term metamorphosis, has
been around for almost a decade and was first utilized to create animation and special effects in various blockbuster films, music videos, and television commercials.
SeeJeff Prosise, Morphing: Magic on Your PC, PC MAG., June 14, 1994, at 325. Although this computer process is mainly used by the large-scale entertainment industry, ingenious software companies have made this process available for many
personal computer users. See id. Once a visual image is transferred into the computer's memory via a scanner, many relatively inexpensive and easy-to-use software
packages can be used to animate the visual image or transform it into a completely
different image. See Richard Core, Morphing It's Notjuwt for MichaelJacksonAnynore,

SAN DmIEG Bus.J., Feb. 22, 1993, at 1, 24. By combining two highly technical processes called warping and cross-dissolving, the computer enables the user, without
much computer skills or knowledge, to animate and transform photographs or
other visual images. See Prosise, supra, at 325-27. This morphing process enables
computer users to take innocent images of actual children and make them appear
as if they are nude or participating in some type of sexual activity. SeeJohnson, supr, at 313-14. In addition, computer users are able to use this technology in order
to scan photographs of adult pornography and transform them into images that ap-

pear to be of a child. See Debra D. Burke, The Cnminalizationof Vrtual Child Pornography: A ConstitutionalQuestion, 34 HARv.J. ON LEGIS. 439, 440-41 (1997).

Most of these software packages are relatively inexpensive, very easy to install
and apply, and can be used on most personal computers. SeeJohnson, supra, at 314.
Programs such as Gryphon Software Corporation's "Morph" and Black Belt System's
WinImages Release 3.1," are available for under $100 and provide computer users
with technologically advanced special-effects and morphing capabilities. See Core,
supra, at 1, 24. Although these programs do not provide home users with the
graphic and morphing capabilities used by the entertainment industry, the technology is rapidly advancing and most programs can produce images of "photorealistic quality." SeeJohnson, supra,at 314.
For purposes of this Note, material created by the previously discussed process
will be called computer altered or morphed images. This type of material, which
has been prohibited by recent changes to the federal child pornography statute,
may still be harmful to children if the photographs used to create the images are of
actual, identifiable minors. Therefore, under the Supreme Court's holdings in
both New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S 747 (1982) and Osbore v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103

(1990), because actual children are the basis of these images, there are no constitutional problems with prohibiting the possession and creation of this type of material. See infranotes 67-74 and accompanying text for a more detailed discussion.
See Kathleen K. Weigner & Julie Schlax, But Can She Act?, FORBES, Dec. 10,
1990, at 274. These computer-generated three-dimensional images are created by a
relatively new computer imaging process. See id. The computer programmer, using
a clay or human model, can digitize the model into the computer using video-type
computer hardware. See id. at 278. Then, using technologically advanced computer
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these images are quite expensive and the images and animation
produced are easily distinguishable from actual persons and movements." Many experts believe, however, that within a few years, due
to the rapid advancement of computer technology, these computergenerated images will be impossible to distinguish from actual photographs. Additionally, industry insiders speculate that the requisite
software and hardware will soon be inexpensive enough to be used
on personal home computers. 2
No actual children are involved or used in the creation of these
computer-generated images; thus the production and possession of
such material causes no direct harm to any child. As this Note will
demonstrate, Congress's recent prohibition on computer-generated
child pornography is a clear and blatant violation of our First
Although Congress has consistently
Amendment principles.'
on child pornography, the Court
its
attack
of
broadened the scope
has upheld this expansion because of the underlying sexual abuse
involved.1 The courts have consistently explained that the government's only compelling and permissible justification for prohibiting
software, the individual can develop the computer image into a human-like image.
See id.; Diana Phillips Mahoney, Face Tracking, COMPUTER GRAPHICS WoRLD, Apr.
1997, at 23, 24 (discussing how computer animators are now even capable of recreating human facial expressions using facial motion capture systems). The computer
user may also animate the computer-generated image by applying software that utilizes what is known as motion capturing systems. See id. at 24. During this process,
retroreflective markers are placed in certain places on a motion actor. See id. The
markers are then illuminated by lasers to produce reflected lights that are picked
up by a digital video camera and transferred into the computer. See id. The computer then analyzes and calculates the movements and records them into memory.
See id. The software then enables the computer user to apply the recorded motions
to realistically animate computer-generated human-like images. See id.
This technology, at the present time, is very expensive and the images and
animation produced do not appear entirely realistic. See Weigner & Schlax, supra,
at 276 (discussing the entertainment industry's use of this technology to create synthetic actors for blockbuster motion pictures). Most computer experts estimate,
however, that it will only be a few years before the technology is inexpensive enough
to be used by personal computer users and advanced enough to create images and
animation that will appear entirely humanistic. See id. at 274; see also Donna Coco,
CreatingHumansfor Games, COMPUTER GRAPHICS WoRLD, Oct. 1997, at 26 (discussing
the problems software developers face in trying to create realistic-looking humans
via computer generation and animation). For purposes of this Note, materials created pursuant to this previously discussed process will be referred to as computergenerated images.
' SeJohnson, supra note 9, at 315-16.
2 See Philip Elmer-Dewitt, Through the 3-D Looking Glass, TiME, May 1, 1989, at
65.
isSee infra notes 76-81 and accompanying text for a discussion of the constitutional implications of the new statutory changes.
14 See, e.g., NewYork v. Ferber, 459 U.S. 747, 764 (1982).
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child pornography is to prevent the harms associated with participating in the production of such material.'5 This recent legislative
amendment does not serve or advance this sole compelling interest.

The ban on computer-generated sexual material is therefore an unconstitutional violation of free expression.
HISTORY OF CONGRESS'S ATrACK ON CHILD PORNOGRAPHY

Throughout the 1970s, the public grew concerned over rampant
stories of child abuse, child prostitution rings, and the increased
production and availability of child pornography. 6 Congressional
committees blamed these increased incidents on the federal government's failure to pass legislation that directly prohibited the production, sale, or distribution of child pornography. 7 In response,
Congress investigated the child pornography industry and determined that the existing federal laws did not adequately protect children from the harms associated with the creation of child pornography.'8 After numerous debates over the language to be employed,
Congress passed the first federal child pornography statute in 1977.19
is See infra notes 81-125 and accompanying text.

16 SeeAnnemarieJ. Mazzone, Comment, United States v. Knox: ProtectingChildren From Sexual Exploitation Through the Federal Child Pornography Laws, 5 FoRDHAM
INTri±. PRop. MEDIA& ENr. LJ. 167, 174 (1994).
17 SeeS. REP. No. 95-438, at 9, 10 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 47. Up
until this time, prosecutors throughout the country had been relying on obscenity
and sexual abuse statutes to punish instances of child pornography and sexual exploitation. See id.; Mazzone, supranote 16, at 174.
i See ToddJ. Weiss, The Child PornographyAct of 1984: Child Pornographyand the
FirstAmendment, 9 SETON HALL LIAs. J., 327, 338 (1985). Based on its investigation,
Congress concluded that child pornography had grown into a nationwide, multimillion dollar enterprise and that the children used to produce such material were being subjected to harmful effects. See S. REP. No. 95-438, at 5 (1977), reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 42-43. The Senate's report concluded that child pornography
was physically and emotionally harmful to the child participants because it endangered their ability to develop normal, affectionate relationships and caused them to
turn to drugs, prostitution, and molestation as adults. See id. at 9, reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 46.
19 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2253 (West Supp. II 1979) (1977 Act); Mazzone, supra
note 16, at 176 (discussing congressional debates about potential child-protective
legislation). The first provision of this new legislation criminalized the use of children, under the age of 16, to create or produce a visual or print medium involving
sexually explicit conduct. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(a), 2253(1) (West Supp. II 1979).
This provision only applied to material known to have been transported by the
mails or interstate commerce. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(a), 2252(a) (2) (West Supp. II
1979). This section stems from Congress' limited ability to legislate under the
Commerce Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 ('Congress shall have power.., to
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with
the Indian Tribes.").
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For various reasons, this statute proved to be unsuccessful at reducing the amount of child pornography on the market.2 Despite
the failures of the 1977 Act, many states began enacting laws prohibiting the intrastate production, distribution, and receipt of child
pornography.2 ' Although some states followed Congress's lead in
legislating only child pornography that satisfied the Miller v. California definition of obscenity, many states took a more aggressive step
and enacted statutes prohibiting even nonobscene child pornography.' For example, New York prohibited the distribution of nonobscene child pornography. 3 Reviewing that New York statute, the SuMore importantly, however, Congress also made it a crime to transport or receive, for a commercial purpose, through the mails or interstate commerce, any obscene visual or print material involving "the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct." 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a) (West Supp. H 1979). A "minor" was defined
as a child under the age of 16. See id. "Sexually explicit conduct" included actual or
simulated "lewd" poses or acts. See 18 U.S.C. § 2253(1) (West Supp. II 1979). Due
to the Supreme Court's holding in Miller v. California,418 U.S. 15 (1973), Congress
believed that it could only prohibit child pornography that fit within the Miller
standard for obscenity. See S. REP. No. 95-438, at 11-18 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 49-50. Under the Millerstandard for obscenity, a work is only deemed
to be obscene if
(a) [I "the average person applying contemporary community standards," would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) [ ] the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state
law, and (c) [I the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.
Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. Moreover, the Court held that materials not defined as obscene retained full First Amendment protection. See id. at 27; see also Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957).
In addition, these provisions required prosecutors to prove that the defendant
had an intent to sell the child pornography. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a) (West Supp. II
1979). These provisions did not prohibit the noncommercial distribution of child
pornography. SeeWeiss, supra note 18, at 335.
See Clinton, supranote 7, at 128-29; Mazzone, supra note 16, at 182. Over the
first six years, despite the increases in incidents of child sexual exploitation, less
than 30 people were convicted for violating either of these federal provisions. See
H.R. REP. No. 98-536, at 2 (1983), reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 493.
21 See Weiss, supranote 18, at 337.
See id. By 1982, 20 states had criminalized both the distribution and receipt of
nonobscene, sexually explicit depictions of children. See New York v. Ferber, 458
U.S. 747, 749 & n.2 (1982). These statutes did not require that the material appeal
to the prurient interest and did not provide an exception for material containing
serious literary, scientific, educational, or political value. See Weiss, supranote 18, at
338.
See N.Y. PENAL LAw § 263.15 (McKinney 1989); Weiss, supra note 18, at 33738. The New York statute prohibited the production of material that contained
sexual conduct "by a child less than 16 years old." N.Y. PENAL LAw § 263.15. The
statute failed to define sexual conduct in accordance with the Supreme Court's
standard of obscenity. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.00(3) (McKinney 1989).
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preme Court in 1982 made its first decision regarding the constitutionality. of laws dealing with the production and distribution of
nonobscene child pornography.
NEW YORK V. FERBER NONOBSCENE CHILD PORNOGRAPHY IS NOT
PROTECTED BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT.

In New Yor* v. Ferber,4 New York convicted the defendant of selling child pornography to an undercover police officer." Based on
Miller, Mr. Ferber challenged the law as a violation of the First
Amendment." Although the New York Court of Appeals found the
statute unconstitutional,2' an unanimous Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the state could, consistent with First Amendment principles, prohibit the sale, dissemination, and distribution of nonobscene child pornography.28 Even after recognizing the constitutional
concerns presented by such statutes, the Court determined that the
state had a compelling interest in protecting children from the effects of being used to create child pornography." As a result, non24

458 U.S. 747 (1982).

" Seeid. at752.

Seid.
See People v. Ferber, 422 N.E.2d 523, 526 (N.Y. 1981).
See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 774. The Court did not determine whether mere possession of child pornography could be constitutionally prohibited. SeeJohn Quigley, Child Pornography and the Right to Privacy, 43 FLA. L. REv. 347, 351 (1991)
(claiming that the Court avoided this issue because the New York statute did not
explicitly prohibit mere possession).
See Ferber,458 U.S. at 764. Initially, the Court determined that the state had a
compelling interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of children. See id. at 756-57. Based on legislative findings, the Court concluded that the
production of child pornography physiologically, mentally, and emotionally harms
the children employed as subjects for the creation of such material. See id. at 758; S.
REP. No. 95-438, at 5, 9 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 43, 46. Experts have
concluded that involvement in the creation of child pornography caused children
to incur many problems later in life including: sexual disfunctions, problems with
affection, sexual abuse of others, drug and alcohol addictions, and prostitution. See
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 758 n.9. The Court also determined that the Miller test bore no
relation to whether the children involved in producing child pornography suffered
these harms. See id, at 761.
In addition, Justice White, writing for the Court, reasoned that the distribution
of child pornography was inextricably correlated with the sexual abuse of children.
See id. at 759. Because child pornography created a "permanent record" of that
child's victimization, distribution and circulation of such depictions exacerbated the
harm incurred by the child. See id. The Court also reasoned that the child had
some privacy interest not to have his picture circulated among the pedophilic subculture. See id. at 759 n.10. More importantly however, the Justices agreed with the
legislatures in most states that the production of child pornography could not be
effectively controlled by merely investigating and prosecuting the producers of
28
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obscene visual depictions of children engaging in sexual conduct retained no First Amendment protection.
Although Ferber held child pornography to be unprotected
speech under the First Amendment, limits were put on the government's ability to proscribe such material.'" Most pertinent to the
area of computer-generated imaging, the Court stated: "We note
that the distribution of descriptions or other depictions of sexual
conduct, not otherwise obscene, which do not involve live performance or photographic or other visual reproduction of live performances, retains First Amendment protection. "'
In light of Ferber, and because the 1977 Act proved to be quite
ineffective, Congress re-opened its investigation into the child pornography industry in 1982.2 After two years of research and debate

and several proposed amendments, Congress passed the Child Protection Act of 1984 (1984 Act)' as an amendment to the 1977 Act.5 '
This new amendment made several important changes.
Initially, the 1984 Act changed the definition of minor to include all children under age eighteen." Due to the Supreme Court's
holding in Ferber,Congress also dropped the obscenity requirement
in the prohibition provision of the receipt and transportation section
of the child pornography statute." In addition, the 1984 Act rechild pornography. See id. at 759-60. The Court opined that in order to adequately
reduce the amount of child pornography being produced, and thus the amount of
children being sexually abused, it was necessary "to dry up the market" for such material by criminalizing its sale and distribution. See id. at 760.
Moreover, the Court described the social value in the dissemination of child
pornography as "exceedingly modest, if not de minimis." Id. at 762. But see FCC v.
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745-46 (1978) (stating that the First Amendment
protections given to speech do not depend on its offensiveness, content, or social
value). Justice White reasoned that if a depiction of a child engaging in lewd conduct was necessary for a serious literary, scientific, or educational work, an artist
could use alternative means of creating this depiction without actually using a minor. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 762-63. The Court proffered that an artist could use a
young looking adult or some other means of simulation to achieve the depiction of
a child. See id Finally, the Court held that when the government's interest in restricting speech "overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive interests" involved, such
material may be deemed to be without First Amendment protection. See id. at 76364.
so See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764 ("As with all legislation in this sensitive area, the
conduct to be prohibited must be adequately defined by the applicable state law, as
written or authoritatively construed.").
31 Id. at 764-65.
32 SeeWeiss, supra note 18,
at 342.
18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2256 (West Supp. 11 1986).
34 See Mazzone, supra note 16, at
185-86.
See 18 U.S.C. § 2256(1) (West Supp. HI 1986).
See H.R. REP. No. 98-536, at 2, 5, 7 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 492-
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moved the commercial purpose requirement of the 1977 Act." Congress also decided that the original prohibition against nonobscene
print material depicting child pornography was most likely unconstitutional."
STANLEY V. GEORGIA: FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO POSSESS OBSCENE
MATERIALS

After a thorough investigation of the child pornography industry, the Attorney General recommended that states pass legislation
that prohibited the private possession of child pornography." As
several states began passing and enforcing these statutes, defendants
4
started challenging these laws as inconsistent with Stanley v. Georgia, 0
In Stanley, the state convicted the defendant under a statute that
criminalized the possession of obscene material in the privacy of his
93, 496, 498. The 1984 amendment only required that the material in question be
.sexually explicit." See 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a) (2) (A) (West Supp. I 1986).
See H.R. REP,. No. 98-536, at 7 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 498. Because child pornography tended to be "home-made," for personal use, and was usually traded or given away without monetary exchange, the commercial purpose requirement of the 1977 Act made it very difficult to prosecute these offenders. See
Weiss, supra note 18, at 344. Several cases upheld this change in the law and have
applied it broadly. See United States v. Andersson, 803 F.2d 903, 907 (7th Cir.
1986) (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 2252 prohibits even purely private transfers or exchanges of child pornography); United States v. Miller, 776 F.2d 978, 979-80 (11th
Cir. 1985) (holding that the defendant could be convicted for receiving material
even if the state did not show that he had an intention to distribute it).
" See H.R. REP. No. 98-536, at 3, 7 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.CAN. 494,
498. Because the creation of these print materials did not involve the use of children, Congress felt that it could not criminalize such material under the reasoning
in Ferber without a finding of obscenity. See id. These changes in the federal government's attempt to eradicate sexual abuse and child pornography proved to be
much more effective. See Susan G. Caughlan, Note, Private Possessionof Child Pornography: The Tensions Between Stanley v. Georgia and New York v. Ferber, 29 Wm. &
MARY L. Rzv. 187, 199-200 (1987) (discussing how the changes in the 1984 Act increased prosecutions under the federal statute and helped reduce the flow of child
pornography). Congress' power to regulate child pornography was limited, however, by its powers under the Commerce Clause because the 1984 Act only reached
child pornography that traveled or was meant to travel across state lines. See Mazzone, supra note 16, at 187. In 1990, however, Congress made another amendment
to the 1977 Act that prohibited the knowing possession of child pornography, but
only if the depictions were sent by mail or interstate commerce or were produced
with materials that were mailed or shipped in interstate commerce. See 18 U.S.C. §
2252(a) (4) (B) (West Supp. I 1991).
39 See ATrORNEY GEN. COMM. ON PORNOGRAPHY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FINAL
REPor 648-49 (1986). By 1990, 19 states had banned the mere possession of child
pornography in the home. See Mazzone, supranote 16, at 188.
40 394 U.S. 557 (1969); see also Mazzone, supra note 16, at 188
(noting that
commentators suggested that the criminalization of possession of child pornography violated the right to privacy).
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own home.4 ' The Supreme Court held that a prohibition of the
mere private possession of obscene material violated the First
Amendment's guarantee of "free thought and expression. " 4 Although the government could criminalize the distribution or sale of
obscene material, the Supreme Court held that a person's right to
view and read material in the privacy of his own home, regardless of
its social value, was a fundamental guarantee protected by our Constitution. 3
The Court's holding was grounded in a mixture of First
Amendment Jkrinciples and privacy rights guaranteed by the Fourth
Amendment. In a footnote at the conclusion of his opinion, Justice
Marshall stated, "Nor do we mean to express any opinion on statutes
making criminal possession of other types of printed, filmed, or recorded materials."4 5 Thus, until 1990 the government could not outlaw the mere private possession of sexually explicit material, regardless of whether it fell within the Millerstandard.4
See Stanley, 394 U.S. at 558-59.
See id. at 568.
4 See id. at 563-65. The
Court stated:
"The right of the individual to read, to believe or disbelieve, and to
think without governmental supervision is one of our basic liberties,
but to dictate to the mature adult what books he may have in his own
private library seems to the writer to be a clear infringement of his
constitutional rights as an individual."
Id. at 562 n.7 (quoting State v. Mapp, 166 N.E.2d 387, 393 (Ohio 1960)).
See id. at 564-65.
45 Id. at568n.11.
46 See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 108 (1990). Although
the Stanley Court
recognized a constitutional right to possess obscene material, the Supreme Court
has held this does not create correlative rights to receive or distribute such material.
See United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 143 (1973) (holding that Stanley cannot be
extended to include a correlative right to receive, transport, or distribute obscene
material); United States v. 12 200-FL Reels of Super 8MM Film, 413 U.S. 123, 128
(1973) (holding that the government may, consistent with Stanley, prohibit the foreign importation of obscene material); United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 356
(1971) (holding that Stanley did not affect the government's power to prohibit the
use of the mail to distribute obscene materials); see also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186, 195 (1986) (holding that Stanley could not be extended to prohibit the
government from banning homosexual sodomy even if it occurs in the privacy of
one's home). Although many commentators have questioned whether the Bowers
Court effectively overruled and discarded the Stanley holding, Bowers did not implicate First Amendment interests as Stanley did. See id. (stating that Stanley was "firmly
grounded in the First Amendment7); see also Claudia Tuchman, Note, Does Privacy
Have Four Walls? Salvaging Stanley v. Georgia, 94 CoLUM. L. Rzv. 2267, 2286-87
(1994) (distinguishing Bowers from Stanley by describing Bowers as a rejection of
sexual privacy rights for homosexuals); BrettJ. Williamson, Note, The Constitutional
Privacy Doctrine After Bowers v. Hardwick: Rethinking the Second Death of Substantive
Due Process, 62 S. CAL. L. REv. 1297, 1299-1301 (1989) (discussing the Bowers deci41
4
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OSBORNE V. OHIO: AN EXCEPTION FOR CHILD PORNOGRAPHY

As states began prosecuting citizens for merely possessing or
viewing child pornography in their homes, defendants unsuccessfully
argued that the prosecutions violated their First Amendment rights
enunciated in Stanley.47 The Court finally resolved the issue in Osborne v. Ohio.48 In Osborne, the state convicted the defendant of possessing several pictures of child pornography in his home.4 The defendant challenged his conviction based on Stanley, arguing that
Ohio's law violated his First Amendment right to possess and view
obscene materials in the privacy of his home.5 Although the Court
did not overrule Stanley, Justice White held that Ohio's interest in
preventing the sexual abuse of children justified such an intrusion
on First Amendment rights."
Justice White reasoned that, because the prohibition on the distribution of child pornography passed constitutional muster, the
criminalization of possession of child pornography must also be
permissible. 2 Although the Stanley Court rejected a similar argument as it related to obscene materials, the Osborne Court relied on
the final footnote in Stanley to justify such a departure." Based on
sion as the Court's rejection of substantive due process protection for sexual privacy).
See Mazzone, supra note 16, at 188. See, e.g., Ex ParteFelton, 526 So. 2d 638
(Ala. 1988) (holding that Stanley does not control the state's ability to prohibit the
possession of child pornography); State v. Beckman, 547 So. 2d 210 (Fla. Dist. Ct
App. 1989) (holding that the defendant's conviction for possessing child pornography did not violate his First Amendment rights); People v. Geever, 522 N.E.2d 1200
(Ill. 1988) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to a statute criminalizing the possession of child pornography); State v. Young, 525 N.E.2d 1363 (Ohio 1988) (holding
that the state's prohibition on the possession of child pornography was constitutionally valid); State v. Meadows, 503 N.E.2d 697 (Ohio 1986) (rejecting the argument that Stanley prevents the government from prohibiting the possession of child
pornography); Savery v. State, 767 S.W.2d 242 (Tex. Ct App. 1989) (upholding the
state's child pornography statute against a First Amendment attack).
a 495 U.S. 103 (1990).
49 See Osborne, 495 U.S. at 107.
50

See id. at 108.

See id. ("[W] e nonetheless find this case distinct from Stanley because the interests underlying child pornography prohibitions far exceed the interests justifying
the Georgia law at issue in Stanley.").
s2 See id. at 109-10 ("Given the importance of the State's interest in protecting
the victims of child pornography, we cannot fault Ohio for attempting to stamp out
this vice at all levels in the distribution chain.").
as See id. at 110; Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 n.11 (1969). In addition,
relying on the 1986 Attorney General's Report on Pornography, the majority concluded that "pedophiles use child pornography to seduce other children into sexual
activity." Osborne, 495 U.S. at 111. The Attorney General's Final Report stated:
Child pornography is often used as part of a method of seducing child
51
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the limitations created by Stanley and Ferber, the Osborne Court held
that states could prohibit the mere possession of child pornography,
provided their purpose was to protect children from the harms
caused by the production of child Rornography and not to regulate
people's thoughts and expressions.
This trilogy of cases seems to create a clear set of principles regarding First Amendment rights as they relate to sexually explicit
expression. Although the government can prohibit the sale and distribution of obscene materials, it cannot punish citizens for merely
viewing or possessing obscene materials in the privacy of their own
homes." When the sexually explicit material contains depictions of
children, however, the government may prohibit the production,
sale, distribution, and possession of such material, whether it is legally obscene or not." Even though the government may prohibit
such nonobscene material, its authority is limited to visual depictions
that are made using actual children under the age of majority." In
addition, the government may only prohibit the possession of child
pornography in an effort to protect children from the harms resulting from their participation in the production of such material.-"

victims. A child who is reluctant to engage in sexual activity with an
adult or to pose for sexually explicit photos can sometimes be convinced by viewing other children having "fun" participating in the activity.
ATroRtN
GERN. COMM. ON PORNOGRAPHY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTncE, FINAL REPORT 649
(1986) (footnotes omitted).
See Osborne, 495 U.S. at 109. The Osborne Court noted that the Ohio scheme
differed from the Georgia scheme in Stanley because "[t]he State does not rely on a
paternalistic interest in regulating Osborne's mind. Rather, Ohio has enacted §
2907.323(A) (3) in order to protect the victims of child pornography; it hopes to
destroy a market for the exploitative use of children." Id. Immediately after Osborne, Congress initiated legislation that prohibited the mere possession of child
pornography. See 136 CONG. REc. S4729-30 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 1990) (statement of
Sen. Thurmond). This bill was passed into law in 1990; however, because of Congress' limits under the Commerce Clause, the provision only prohibits possession of
child pornography that was mailed or shipped by interstate commerce or was created with materials that were mailed or shipped in interstate commerce. See 18
U.S.C. § 2252(a) (4) (West Supp. 11 1991).
See Stanley, 394 U.S. at 568 (noting that "the States retain broad power to regulate obscenity; that power simply does not extend to mere possession by the individual in the privacy of his own home.").
See Osborne, 495 U.S. at 111; NewYork v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 774 (1982).
sl See United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 78 (1994) (holding
that the First Amendment requires that the federal child pornography statute contain a scienter requirement showing that the offender knew the participant in the
visual material was underage).
M See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764.
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1996 AMENDMENT: PROHIBITING VISUAL IMAGES THAT APPEAR TO BE
OF A MINOR

In 1995 Congress proposed a bill that seems to conflict with
these basic principles laid out by the Supreme Court. The proposed
bill," sponsored by Senator Hatch, made several changes to Congress's attack on child pornography. Most pertinent, the Hatch
Amendment expanded the definition of child pornography to cover
"any visual depiction, including.., any computer or computergenerated image or picture, whether made or produced by electronic, mechanical or other means.., where such visual depiction is,
or appears to be, of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct."0
Through this proposal, Congress has tried to address the new technological advances in computer imaging software that enable users
to create realistic looking images of people, including children. 1 Officials endorsing this new legislation believe that these computer capabilities, if possessed and utilized by pedophiles and other child
abusers, would hinder the government's ability to prosecute child
pornographers
and protect children from sexual abuse and molesta62
tion.

SeeS. REP. No. 104-358, at 1 (1996). The bill, labeled S. 1237, was
introduced
to Congress by Senator Hatch on August 27, 1996. See id.
60 18 U.S.C.A. § 2256 (8) (B) (West Supp. 1998). In addition,
this proposed legislation has made it a crime to knowingly mail, ship, or distribute by interstate
commerce, including by computer, any child pornography as defined by the previously stated provision. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252A (West Supp. 1998). This provision
has also prohibited the possession of three or more visual images of child pornography, if they were mailed or shipped in interstate commerce or were produced using materials that were mailed or transported in interstate commerce. See 18
U.S.C.A. § 2252A(a) (5) (B) (West Supp. 1998).
61 See S. REP. No. 104-358, at 7 (1996). The report
stated:
This legislation is needed due to technological advances in the recording, creation, alteration, production, reproduction, distribution
and transmission of visual images and depictions, particularly through
the use of computers. Such technology has made possible the production of visual depictions that appear to be of minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct which are virtually indistinguishable to unsuspecting viewers from unretouched photographs of actual children
engaging in identical sexual conduct.
Id.
See id. at 2. In his report to the Senate, Senator Hatch explained that computer-generated child pornography, which is created without the use of an actual
child, posed a few possible threats to the physical and psychological well-being of
children. See id. at 7. For instance, Congress felt that pedophiles used this material
to foster and encourage their activities of child abuse and to "feed their sexual fantasies." Id. at 12. Also, Senator Hatch's report explained that because computers
could create realistic images, not prohibiting computer-generated child pornography would make it more difficult for prosecutors to prove that other prohibited
59
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Although the goal of protecting children is compelling, a few
members of Congress disagreed with the constitutional validity of
these proposed amendments to the federal child pornography statutes." Specifically, both Senators Biden and Feingold voiced their
opposition to the Hatch Amendment because they felt it conflicted
with the Supreme Court's holdings in Osborne and Ferber." The senators expressed concern that the proposed changes were not aimed at
protecting children from the harms associated with their participation in child pornography but rather bordered on censorship." Despite this opposition, Congress enacted the Hatch Amendment to
the 1977 Act on September 30, 1996."
CONGRESS MAY OUTLAW SEXUALLY EXPLICIT IMAGES OF AN
IDENTIFIABLE MINOR"

"ACTUAL,

Although Congress rejected Senator Biden's concerns about the
constitutionality of a prohibition of computer-generated child pornography, an amendment was adopted that outlaws sexually explicit
images created by the computer alteration or morphing of visual materials depicting actual children. 7 This provision provides an alterchild pornography was made with the use of actual children. See id. at 16-17.
Finally, Congress reasoned that because of the material's realistic nature, pedophiles and other child abusers could use computer-generated child pornography
"to seduce or blackmail the child into submitting to sexual abuse or exploitation."
Id. at 16. For these reasons, endorsers of this bill believed that the purposes behind
this legislation was compelling enough to satisfy any level of constitutional scrutiny.
See id. at 20-21. Specifically, Senator Hatch explained that Ferber and Osborne held
that all sexually explicit images depicting children are without First Amendment
protection, especially in light of the compelling interest in protecting children from
future sexual abuse and molestation. See id.
See id. at 36-38. A few officials felt that the new changes would be a violation
of First Amendment rights. See id. (highlighting the views of Senators Biden and
Feingold). In addition, Senators Kennedy and Simon expressed their opposition to
the bill because it implemented mandatory minimum sentencing. See id. at 33-35.
As amended, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2251(d) requires a mandatory sentence of 10 years
imprisonment for persons convicted of sexually exploiting a minor. See 18 U.S.CA.
§ 2251(d) (West Supp. 1998). Under 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252(b) (1), previously convicted offenders who receive or distribute child pornography must be sentenced to
at least five years in prison. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252(b)(1) (West Supp. 1998). Defendants who have been previously convicted of a child pornography offense and
are convicted of possessing three or more articles of child pornography must be
sentenced to at least two years in prison. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252(b) (2) (West Supp.
1998).
SeeS. REP. No. 104-358, at29, 37 (1996).
a eeid.
N See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2251-2258 (West Supp. 1998).
6
7See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2256. Under the statute child pornography means "any visual
depiction, including any ... computer

or computer-generated

image or pic-
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native definition of child pornography in the event that the clause
that prohibits computer-generated images created without the use of
m
an actual minor is struck down as unconstitutional."
Unlike Senator Hatch's definition, the alternative clause only
prohibits child pornography created by the computer alteration or
morphing of visual images produced by using a person that could be
identified as an actual child." Together, these two additions to the
definition of child pornography have made it a federal crime knowingly to create, possess, sell, or distribute nonobscene, sexually explicit images that appear to depict a child, regardless of whether the
image actually involves a living child.70
Under the Court's holdings in both Ferberand Osborne, Congress
may prohibit the creation, distribution, and possession of visual images that are created using a photograph of an actual, identifiable
child. Although the photographs used are often innocent pictures
involving no depiction of the child engaging in lewd or lascivious
conduct, this material cannot be created without sexually exploiting
the image of an actual, identifiable minor.71
In Ferber, the Court justified the prohibition of child pornography because "the materials produced are a permanent record of the
children's particiation and the harm to the child is exacerbated by
their circulation." This language implies that Congress is permitted
to prevent actual children from being the subject of sexually explicit
images. Ironically, most photographs used to make computer-altered
child pornography are not depictions of actual children engaging in
ture,.. . where such visual depiction has been created, adapted, or modified to appear that an identifiable minor is engaging in sexually explicit conduct" Id. Under
the statute an identifiable minor is one "who was a minor at the time the visual depiction was created, adapted, or modified or whose image as a minor was used in
creating, adapting, or modifying the visual depiction; and who is recognizable as an
actual person by the person's face, likeness or other distinguishing characteristic."
Id.
68 See S. REP. No. 104-358, at 31 (1996). Congress added a severability
clause to
the amendment in case Senator Hatch's definition of child pornography was held
to be impermissible. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252A(a) (5) (B) (West Supp. 1998).
6 In many cases, innocent pictures of actual, live children would be scanned
onto a computer screen and altered or morphed by software to create a visual image
of a nude child or one engaging in sexually explicit conduct. See supra note 9 and
accompanying text. This is quite different than visual images that are completely
generated by a computer without the use of a child or a photograph of a child, because an actual, identifiable child is the basis for the sexually explicit image. See
Johnson, supra note 9, at 314-15.
70 See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2252, 2256 (West Supp. 1998).
See supra note 9 and accompanying text for a discussion of the morphing
process.
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 (1982).
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any sexually explicit conduct. In fact, many of the children whose
live images are used to produce sexually explicit images are unaware
that their photographic images are being altered or morphed."'
The Ferber Court also reasoned that children are harmed because their participation in a sexual act has been permanently recorded. 74 Although this computer-altered visual image may be created without an actual child participating in a sexual act or pose, this
should not end the inquiry.7 Such material still requires the exploitation of an actual child's identity and image for sexually explicit
purposes and should be deemed an invasion of that child's privacy
rights."' In Ferber,Justice White implied that the production and distribution of a child's image for sexually explicit purposes constitutes
an invasion of that child's privacy interests."' Therefore, even though
no actual child has been abused to create the sexually explicit image,
an actual child's identity and image has been exploited for sexual
and commercial purposes. Congress, and the states as well, should
be permitted to protect children by Vreventing their identity and features from being sexually exploited.
CONGRESS MAY NOT BAN NONOBSCENE, SEXUALLY EXPuCIT IMAGES

THAT DO NOT DEPICT AN ACTUAL, IDENTIFIABLE CHILD
It is not so clear, however, whether the government can constitutionally prohibit people from creating, possessing, and even disseminating computer-generated images of child pornography that
are created without the use of an actual, identifiable minor. Obviously, if the material is obscene under the Miller standard, Congress
Se supranote 9 and accompanying text.
&e
SeeFerber,458 U.S. at 759 & n.10.
7 See Adelman, supra note 7, at 484 n.13 (arguing that prohibiting sexually ex74

plicit computer alterations of photographs of actual children would not violate the
First Amendment).
76

Seid.

" See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 758 n.9 ("When such performances are recorded and
distributed, the child's privacy interests are also invaded."); see also United States v.
Wiegand, 812 F.2d 1239, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987) (explaining that the child's "human
dignity" is offended when he is used as a subject for child pornography). This dignity is equally offended when a real child's identity or image is used to create sexually explicit images by computer. See Prison-ComputerList Centers on Information About
Children, ORANGE COUTY REGISTER, Nov. 20, 1996, at A21 (discussing a convicted
sex offender who used photographs of children from community newspapers to
compile a catalog of 3000 children on his computer apparently intended to be distributed to other pedophiles).
78 See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759 n. 10 (suggesting that child "pornography may haunt
[ithe exploited child] in future years'); Adelman, supranote 7, at 484 n.13.
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may prohibit its dissemination and receipt regardless of whether the
material depicts children. 9 Even if material is declared obscene under Stanley, however, the government should not be able to punish
people for merely possessing child pornography created solely by
computer software and the user's imagination. Moreover, if this type
of material is deemed not to be obscene, then it should possess full
constitutional protection.8 In order to survive constitutional scru9 SeMiller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23-24 (1973).
80 Under the Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence, any government regulation restricting the freedom of speech must be scrutinized under one of
two standards of analysis. See LAupasciE H. TRIE, AMEIC.AN CONSnT=TONAL LAW §
12-2, at 582 (1978). In determining which analysis to apply to a given statute, the
Court must first determine if the restriction on speech is content-based or contentneutral. See Martin H. Redish, The Content Distinction in FirstAmendment Analysis, 34
STAN. L. REV. 113, 113, 114 (1981). If the government's purpose is to suppress
speech because of the communicative impact of the expression, then the statute is
content-based and presumptively invalid unless the speech itself falls within a category of unprotected speech, such as obscenity, or the statute satisfies strict scrutiny.
See TRIBE, supra, at 582. Under the Court's strict scrutiny standard of review, the
statute must be narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state interest. See Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (stressing that governmental restrictions on fundamental rights must be subjected to this stringent standard ofjudicial review).
If the challenged regulation is content-neutral, not aimed at restricting the
speech because of its message, then the statute will be scrutinized under a track two
standard of analysis. See TRIBE, supra, at 582. Under this more relaxed standard of
review, usually reserved for content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions,
the government's provision is valid if it serves an important governmental interest,
is not aimed at the content of the speech, and leaves open other channels of communication. See, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88-89 (1949) (upholding an
ordinance forbidding the use of sound trucks for any expressive purpose). See
James R. Branit, Reconciling Free Speech and Equality: What Justifies Censorship?, 9
HARv.J.L. & PUB. POLy 429, 436-37 (1986) (contending that this track two standard
of analysis should not be applied to restrictions on sexual material). Because the
material proscribed under the new child pornography statute covers some material
that does not fall within any category of traditionally unprotected speech and because the statute is clearly a content-based restriction, the statute is presumptively
unconstitutional unless it survives strict scrutiny. See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329,
2346 (1997) (applying a heightened degree of scrutiny to legislation prohibiting
the transmission of sexual material over the internet); Sable Communications, Inc.
v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (applying strict scrutiny to a statute banning indecent phone messages).
The 1996 amendment has been recently challenged by a trade association, several artists, and book publishers on First Amendment grounds. See The Free
Speech Coalition v. Reno, No. C 97-0281VSC, 1997 WL 487758, at *1 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 12, 1997). Specifically, the plaintiffs in Free Speech Coalition argued that the
statute outlawed legitimate artistic materials that do not constitute child pornography and have always been deemed protected by the First Amendment. See id. at *2.
In rejecting the plaintiffs' contentions, the district court upheld the new amendment as a valid content-neutral restriction because it was aimed at preventing the
secondary effects of child pornography including its effect on society, its effect on
viewers, and its potential to be used to lure child victims. See id. at *4. Relying on
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tiny, the new amendment to the child pornography laws must be the
least restrictive means of achieving a compelling governmental interest.8 '
In Miller, the Supreme Court declared that all sexually explicit
but not obscene material retained First Amendment protection.2
the Court's secondary effects theory as enunciated in Young v. Amercan Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) and Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986),
the district court concluded that because the statute is aimed at curbing these secondary effects it is content-neutral and subject to less than strict First Amendment
scrutiny. See Free Speech Coalition, 1997 WL 487758, at *4.
Although the Court relied on the secondary effects theory in Renton and Young,
the legislation upheld in those cases were zoning regulations that only prohibited
adult theaters in certain parts of the city. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 46; Young, 427 U.S.
at 52. The Court specifically explained that because the regulations did not ban
adult theaters altogether, they were valid time, place, and manner restrictions that
are reviewed under intermediate scrutiny. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 46, 50; Young, 427
U.S. at 62. The Court went on to rely on its secondary effects theory because the
time, place, and manner regulations were only directed at certain theaters based on
the content of the films they exhibited. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 46-47; Young, 427
U.S. at 70, 71. The Court further elaborated that an otherwise content-neutral time,
place, and manner restriction does not become a content-based restriction because
the legislature's purpose was based on the subject matter of the regulated material.
See Renton, 475 U.S. at 48-49. Finally, the Court implied that its secondary effects
theory would notjustify a regulation that effectively banned adult theaters from the
city. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 54; Young, 427 U.S. at 70-71; see also Reno, 117 S. Ct. at
2342 (stressing that Renton does not justify a blanket prohibition of sexually explicit
expression).
Based on a reading of these cases, the district court incorrectly applied the secondary effects theory in Free Speech Coalition. The changes to the child pornography
statute are not an otherwise content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction because they effectuate a blanket prohibition on sexually explicit, computer generated
images that appear to be of a child. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2256(a)(8) (West Supp.
1998). Because this new amendment is not a time, place, and manner regulation
and because it is clearly content based, the Court's secondary effects theory will not
justify the use of less than strict scrutiny review. See, e.g., Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2342
(stressing that protecting children from the effects of sexual material on the internet is not a secondary effect under Renton's reasoning).
,1 See Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (holding that
restrictions on sexual expression are subject to strictjudicial review).
a See Miller, 413 U.S. at 27. Since Miller, a few commentators have argued that
sexually explicit material constitutes low value speech and therefore, only deserves
limited First Amendment protections. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Comment, AntiPornographyLegislation as Viewpoint-Discrimination,9 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 461, 47778 (1986) (arguing that pornography constitutes a new category of low-value speech
because of its harmful, unconscious effects on viewers and its noncognitive similarity to obscene expression); Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the Frst Amendment,
1986 DuIE LJ. 589, 606-07 (contending that nonobscene pornographic materials
should be provided limited First Amendment protection because it operates in a
noncognitive manner). On the other hand, many analysts have criticized this lowvalue approach to sexual expression and have argued that the Court's definition of
obscenity draws the line between unprotected and fully protected speech. See
Branit, supra note 80, at 440-43 (claiming that pornography is not a form of unpro-

1346

SETONHALL LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 28:1328

The Stanley decision, which preceded the Miller case, held that even
obscene material retained limited First Amendment protection when
merely possessed within the privacy of one's home." When faced
with the issue of nonobscene child pornography, however, the Supreme Court has carved out an exception to these widely accepted
tected expression because it is not obscene and does not satisfy the stringent
Brandenburg test for dangerous and harmful speech); Mary C. Dunlap, Sexual Speech
and the State: Putting Pornography in its Place, 17 GoLDEN GATm U. L. Rxv. 859, 862,
374-75 (1987) (explaining that the Court's reasoning for allowing restrictions on
obscenity cannot be extended to deny all sexually explicit material full constitutional protections); Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Theory of LoupValue Speech, 48 SMU L.
REV. 297, 327-28 (1995) (questioning the constitutional validity of a low-ralue approach to providing protected expression with less than full First Amendment protection). The Supreme Court has never specifically addressed the issue of providing sexually explicit material with a lesser degree of First Amendment protection.
Although the Court has sanctioned the use of differing degrees of protection for
different forms of speech, such as commercial speech and nonverbal speech, the
Court has never explicitly stated that sexual expression deserves less than full First
Amendment protection. See Sabk, 492 U.S. at 126 (stating that nonobscene sexual
expression is "protected by the First Amendment*).
In Southeastern PromotionsLtd. v. Conrad,420 U.S. 546, 547-48 (1975), town officials prohibited the plaintiff from performing the musical Hairat a local municipal
theater because it contained nudity and sexually explicit scenes. See Conrad, 420
U.S. at 547-48. Despite the musical's sexually provocative themes, the Court applied a strict scrutiny test and found the prior restraint to be a violation of the First
Amendment. See id. at 557-58. Similarly, in Eznoznik v. City ofJacksonville, 422 U.S.
205, 206-07 (1975), a town passed an ordinance prohibiting drive-in movie theaters
from displaying films that contained nude scenes. See id. at 206-07. In striking
down the ordinance as violative of the First Amendment, the Court held that the
government could not restrict sexually explicit speech just because it may be offensive to some members of the public. See id. at 210-11. Finally, in Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 117 (1989), the Court struck down a federal regulation
that prohibited the transmission of indecent commercial telephone messages to
adults. See id. After declaring that sexual expression is protected by the First
Amendment, the Court invalidated the restriction because it was not the least restrictive means of achieving the government's compelling interest in protecting
children. See id. at 131. But see Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 570-71
(1991) (holding that nude dancing could be prohibited in lounges and adult
stores, not because of the value of the expressive activity but because of its secondary effects); Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46-47 (1986) (holding
that a restriction on the location of adult movie theaters was a content-neutral regulation, and therefore subject to a more deferential standard of review because the
regulation focused on eradicating the secondary effects caused by such theaters);
Young v. American Movie Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 62 (1976) (using a more deferential level of scrutiny to uphold an ordinance restricting the location of adult
theaters and bookstores). In these few cases where the Court has upheld restrictions on sexually explicit expression, the Court did state that sexual expression is a
highly valued form of expression. See Shaman, supra, at 309 (explaining that a majority of the Court has never held sexual expression to be of low First Amendment
value).
3 See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 559 (1969).
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principles of First Amendment law." Although the Court has held
child pornography to be without First Amendment protection, even
if merely possessed, the Court's reasoning has been based on eradicating the despicable means that were once necessary to produce
these visual images-the underlying sexual abuse of children."
The Supreme Court has departed from constitutional principles
in order to permit the government to prohibit even the mere possession of child pornography. Even so, Congress may only regulate and
prohibit nonobscene child pornography to dry up its production."
It is the injuries that children incur when they are used to produce
these visual images and the harms stemming from the future distribution of such visual depictions that have driven the Court to stray
from deeply rooted principles of First Amendment law."
These harms are not present when a sexually explicit image depicting an imaginary child is created solely by computer technology
without the use of an actual child participant. When the computerSee Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 108 (1990).
See id. at 109-10. As Judge Beezer of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit eloquently put it:
A child pornography law is akin to a child labor law: both are concerned with the conduct through which a product is made, not with
what the product is or the product's effect on consumers. Accordingly, 'Ferber seems to signal a heightened sensitivity on the Court's
part to the harms that pornographic activity can inflict upon participants."
United States v. United States Dist. Court for the Central Dist. of Cal., 858 F.2d 534,
545 (9th Cir. 1988) (Beezer, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (quoting LAuRltNcE
TRIBE, AmERicAN CONS'rrrJTONAL LAW § 12-16, at 914-15 (2d ed. 1988)); see alsoJeffreyJ. Kent & Scott D. Truesdell, Spare the Child: The Constitutionalityof Criminalizing
Possession of Child Pornography,68 OR. L. Rzv. 363, 387 (1989) (explaining that child
pornography may be restricted or prohibited because it is "part of a continuing
course of illegal conduct and not... 'speech' in the usual sense").
See Osborne, 495 U.S. at 109-10.
For instance, in United States v. Smith, 795 F.2d 841, 844-45 (9th Cir. 1986),
the defendant was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 2252 for mailing undeveloped
and unprocessed photographic film that was taken of semi-nude minors. See id.
The defendant argued that the term visual depiction did not include undeveloped
film because no visual image had yet been created. See id. at 846. The court rejected this argument, explaining that it was not the state of the development of the
film that was important, but rather the child's participation underlying the creation
of the undeveloped material. See id. at 846-47.
Smith illustrates that Congress' primary and sole objective in prohibiting child

pornography is to protect the children who are victimized when the material is created and not to regulate the image itself. With computer-generated child pornography, there is no underlying harmful or illegal conduct for Congress to regulate or
prohibit.

8 See supra note 10 and accompanying text for a discussion of the computergeneration process.
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generated images are created and distributed, no actual child has
been subjected to any form of sexual abuse and no actual child's privacy interests have been exploited or invaded." Therefore, Congress
cannot defend such an intrusion on First Amendment rights on the
basis of protecting children because no actual child has been used or
abused to produce these computer images.
In addition, the FerberCourt stated that sexually explicit images
of children that are not the result of a child's live performance retain
First Amendment protection.* The Court reaffirmed this reasoning
in United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc.,91 when it held that a defendant could not be constitutionally convicted under a child pornography statute unless he knew that the material contained depictions
of children under the age of majority." In reaching its conclusion,
the Court explained that "the age of the performers is the crucial
element separating legal innocence from wrongful conduct."93 Under the Court's holding, if the subject of the visual image is over the
age of majority or the possessor reasonably believed so, the individual possessing the material could not be prosecuted under the child
pornography statutes." Although the Court did not consider the issue of computer-generated subjects, the Court's language strongly

N See supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text. It would be a different story if
the image creator used an actual child to model while the image was created by
computer. This is because an actual child has been used to create the image. Even
a sexually explicit artistic drawing or sculpture, if created while using a child model,
would involve some level of participation by an actual child and would constitute
some form of sexual abuse. In addition, that child model's identity has been reproduced either on the canvas or computer screen and if distributed or exploited,
would be an infringement of that child's privacy rights.
90 See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764-65 (1982).
91 513 U.S. 64 (1994).
See X-Citetnt Video, 513 U.S. at 78. In X-Citement Video, the defendant, an
adult video retailer and distributor, was convicted for distributing a pornographic
film depicting the live performance of a minor. See id. at 66. In his defense, the
defendant argued that the federal child pornography statutory scheme was unconstitutional because it did not specifically require the government to prove that the
defendant knew that the material contained depictions of children. See id. at 66-67.
Although the Court did not invalidate the statute, ChiefJustice Rehnquist held that
the provision was not constitutional unless it contained a scienter requirement with
ressect to the age of the participants in the sexually explicit material. See id. at 78.
Id. at 73. Congress' recent prohibition on computer-generated materials is
difficult to reconcile with the Court's holding in X-Citement Video because the new
amendment prohibits material with no actual human performer whose age can be
reasonably determined or inferred by the trier of fact. See Burke, supra note 9, at
452-54 (articulating the inherent problems in construing the new amendment in

accordance with the Court's decision in X-Citement Video).
" See X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 72-73.

1998]

COMPUTER-GENERATED CHILD PORNOGRAPHY

1349

implies that an individual may only be prosecuted for possessing material that depicts an actual person under the age of majority.'"
Over the past decade, a few state courts have considered
whether computer-generated child pornography can be constitutionally regulated. In Cinema I Video, Inc. v. Thornburg," the North
Carolina Court of Appeals considered whether the child pornography law could be construed to prohibit visual depictions that were
produced without the use of a live minor.7 Based on the language in
Ferber, the North Carolina court found the child pornography law
unconstitutional unless it required the exploitation of an actual, live
minor as an element of the offense."
Similarly, in Aman v. State," the Georgia Supreme Court was
called upon to construe the breadth and scope of Georgia's child
pornography statute that proscribed visual material that "depicts a
minor."'9' The Aman court held that the term "depict a minor" must
be limited to visual representations of a live minor in order for the
Georgia statute to survive constitutional scrutiny.O1 The Georgia
court explained that the state's objective in protecting children from
the harms of child pornography was only served by banning child
pornography that was "based on the use of a live child model."'0'

See id.
351 S.E.2d 305 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986).
See Cinema I Vel., 351 S.E.2d at 318-19. The plaintiffs, comprised of a group
of videotape sellers and viewers, sought a judgment declaring North Carolina's
child pornography statute unconstitutional as drafted. See id. at 309, 319. The challenged statute prohibited "material that contains a visual representation of a minor
engaged in sexual activity." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.17(a) (2) (1993). A preceding
section, however, defined "material" as "[p]ictures, drawings, video recordings,
films or other visual depictions or representations .... " N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14190.13(2) (1993). The plaintiffs argued that these provisions could be authoritatively construed to encompass materials produced without the use of an actual
child. See Cinema I Video, 351 S.E.2d at 319.
98 See CinemaI Video, 351 S.E.2d at 319.
409 S.E.2d 645 (Ga. 1991).
'0 See Aman, 409 S.E.2d at 646. In Aman, Georgia convicted the defendant
for
possessing articles of child pornography. See id. The statute made it "unlawful for
any person knowingly to possess or control any material which depicts a minor engaed in any sexually explicit conduct." GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-100(b) (8) (1996).
01 See Aman, 409 S.E.2d at 646.
12 Id. at 647 (Hunt, J., concurring). Relying on Osborne, the Georgia Supreme
95

Court found no legitimate basis for legislation that criminalized sexually explicit
material that did not involve the use of an actual child. See id. at 646, 647 (Hunt,J.,
concurring). The court's language implied that protecting children from sexual
exploitation was the only permissible governmental purpose justifying a ban of
child pornography. See id.
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Finally, in State v. Stoneman,10° the Oregon Supreme Court considered the appropriate interpretation of Oregon's child pornography statute.'" Oregon law prohibits the sale of any "visual recording
of sexually explicit conduct involving a child." 5 Relying on Oregon's constitution, the Stoneman court held that the material made
criminal by the statute must be limited to visual reproductions of live
events."* The Oregon court stated that materials merely giving "the
illusion that actual children are involved" could not be prohibited by
the statute.1°
Although the previously discussed statutes did not specifically
exempt from criminal punishment materials produced without the
use of an actual child, courts in these states have limited their application to exempt such material in order to survive constitutional review.'" Several commentators have argued that decisions exempting
such material are a result of statutory interpretation rather than any
constitutional principle.' 8 Rather, such an interpretation is required
920 P.2d 535 (Or. 1996).
See Stoneman, 920 P.2d at 537. In Stoneman, the defendant was arrested for
purchasing certain materials that contained depictions of child pornography. See id.
105 OR. REV. STAT. § 163.686(1) (a) (A) (ii) (1997).
06 See Stoneman, 920 P.2d at 537-38 & n.3. The court relied on a provision of
103

104

Oregon's constitution, similar to the First Amendment, which states that "[nbo law
shall be passed restraining the free expression of opinion, restricting the right to
speak, write, or print freely on any subject whatever; but every person shall be responsible for the abuse of this right." Id. at 537 n.2; OR. GONST. art. I, § 8.
107 Stoneman, 920 P.2d at 538.
108 Several other state child pornography statutes do not explicitly state whether
they are limited to cover only visual reproductions of live events involving actual
children. See AMuz. Rsv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3551(5)(b) (West Supp. 1997) (defining
visual medium as any "computer-generated image of a minor"); CAL. PENAL CoDE §
311.3(a) (West Supp. 1998) (prohibiting computer-generated images that depict a
person under the age of 18); ILL. COMp. STAT. ANN. 5/11-20.1(a)(6) (West 1993)
(defining child pornography as a visual reproduction of a child under age 18);
MIcH. COMp. LAws ANN. § 750.145c(i) (West 1991) (defining child pornography as
any electronic visual image of a child engaging in a sexual act); NJ. STAT. ANN. §
2C:24-4(4) (West 1995) (prohibiting the reproduction or reconstruction of an
"image of a child in a prohibited sexual act"); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.688(1)(a)
(1997) (prohibiting the possession of "any visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct that appears to involve a child"); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6312(d) (West Supp.
1997) (prohibiting computer depictions of a child under age 18). These statutes
do not explicitly state whether they prohibit computer-generated child pornography
produced without the involvement of an actual minor. However, relying on the reasoning in the previously mentioned cases, for these statutes to avoid being invalidated as unconstitutional, they must be interpreted to cover only visual reproductions of actual, live children.
109 See ChildPorographyPrevention Act of 1995: Hearingon S. 1237 Before the Senate
Committee on theJudiciay, 104th Cong. 41, 45 & n.2 (1996) (statement of Professor
Frederick Schauer, Harvard Law School) (stressing the point that sexually explicit
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by the Supreme Court's decisions in both Ferberand Osborne, which
explain that any broader reading of these statutes would prohibit
protected material and render the statutes unconstitutional under
the First Amendment. 110
Some states, on the other hand, have drafted their statutes explicitly to exclude material that is not a reproduction of a live
event" These statutes would clearly survive constitutional scrutiny,
because the states have limited their attack solely to prevent the
harms associated with children being used to create child pornography."' Statutes that are not expressly limited to cover child pornography depicting live performances may still be constitutionally valid
provided they are not interpreted to prohibit nonobscene images
produced without the use of an actual child."' If not, such statutes
run the risk of being declared inconsistent with the First Amendment as set out in Ferber,Miller, and Stanley.

Although no federal court specifically has limited the scope of
the federal child pornography laws to include only depictions of live

events, a few courts of appeals have been faced with the issues presented by computer-generated child pornography. In United States v.
material created without the use of an actual minor cannot be prohibited as a matter of federal constitutional law and not merely due to statutory interpretation).
10 See i&

e AiA. CODE § 13A-12-190(12) (1994) (defining child pornography as any
"visual reproduction of a live act, performance or event"); ALAsKA STAT. §
11.61.127(a) (Michie 1996) (prohibiting the possession of material that "involved
the use of a child under eighteen"); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-193(13) (West
1994) (defining child pornography as "any material involving the live performance"
of a child); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 827.071(4) (West 1994) (prohibiting the possession of
material that "includes any sexual conduct by a child"); IOWA CODE ANN. § 728.12 (2)
(West 1993) (prohibiting visual depictions of a "live performance of a minor engaging in a prohibited sexual act"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3516(2) (1995) (prohibiting
visual material in which a "real child" is shown); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 531.335(1)
(Banks-Baldwin Supp. 1996) (prohibiting visual depictions of "an actual sexual performance by a minor person"); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 573.010(1) (West 1995)
(excluding from the definition of child pornography "material which is not the visual reproduction of a live event"); NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-1463.02(6) (1995) (defining
visual depiction as a representation of a "live performance'); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 306A-3(C) (Michie 1994) (oudawing the creation of a visual image that depicts a child
participant); OHio REv. CoDE ANN. § 2907.322(5) (Anderson 1996) (banning the
possession of "any material that shows a minor participating or engaging in sexual
activity"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1021.2 (West Supp. 1998) (prohibiting
"material involving the participation of any minor"); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2374.1(B) (3) (Michie 1996) (prohibiting sexually explicit computer-generated material "which utilizes or has as a subject" a minor).
12S
Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 109 (1990).
11See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982) ("[T]he conduct to be prohibited must be adequately defined by the applicable state law, as written or
authoritatively construed.").
II
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Nolan," the defendant was convicted for the knowing receipt of
child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2)." 5 On appeal, the defendant argued that the prosecution failed to prove that
the photographs were taken of an actual child. 6 Specifically, Nolan
argued that the prosecution, in order to convict him, had to prove
that the photographs were taken of actual children and not wax figures, mannequins, or composite representations that were faked or
doctored or even created by computer generation. 17 Although the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit refused to place

such a burden on the prosecution, the court gave some credence to
the defendant's claims." 8 In so doing, the court stated that in order
for the defendant to be convicted under § 2252 the jury had to be
convinced that the images in question were made using actual children. 19
This case explains that the government may only prohibit child
pornography that is created with the use of an actual child.' ° Nolan

furthers the proposition that Congress can only constitutionally prohibit nonobscene child pornography in order to protect children.
114

818 F.2d 1015 (1st Cir. 1987).

115 See Nolan, 818 F.2d at 1016. Nolan was convicted for receiving child pornog-

raphy that was sent from a source located in a foreign country. See id. Although 18
U.S.C. § 2252 did not explicitly prohibit child pornography produced in foreign.
countries, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that Congress did not intend to only "protect United States children from the negative effects
116this
See activity has on them." Id. at 1016 n.1.

id. at 1016.

117See id.
lie See id. at 1018-19. The court refused to hold the prosecution to the duty of
"rul[ing] out every conceivable way the pictures could have been made other than
by ordinary photography." Id. at 1020. The court further explained that the jury,
by merely viewing and analyzing the images without the use of expert testimony,
could infer that the "subjects depicted actually existed" and "were of actual, living,
children who were, therefore, 'used' in the production of these pictures." Id. at
1018.
19 See id. at 1018, 1020. Even though the prosecution was not required
to bring
in an expert to prove that the visual depictions were of actual children, the Nolan
court stated:
Whether it would be practicable to manufacture pornography [by
computer generation] is, therefore, purely speculative, and we do not
think the government was required to negative in advance what is
merely unsupported speculation. Appellant, of course, was free to
have presented evidence of his own suggesting that the pictures used
other than real subjects. He could have called an expert to testify as to
how photographs like these could have been made without using real
children.
Id. at 1020.
12
See Nolan, 818 F.2d at 1020.
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Although the Nolan court held that the government did not have the
burden of proving that the material depicted an actual child, it implied that computer generation, without the use of a child, was an
available defense.'2 '
This defense was also recognized in United States v. Kimbrough.'2
The defendant offered evidence that the images in question could
have been created by photograph-altering computer software.Iu In
response, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
stated, "Had the jury believed Kimbrough's defense--that the depictions had been altered and were not of actual children-they could
have easily found so applying the instructions as given."
The only
inference to draw from this statement is that child pornography created solely by computer generation cannot be the basis for criminal
punishment under any child pornography statute.
By placing the burden of proof upon the defendant to prove
that the child pornography in question was made without the use of
an actual child, one of Congress's reasons for prohibiting computergenerated child pornography is rendered meaningless. In his report
to Congress, Senator Hatch argued that the failure to prohibit computer-generated child pornography would pose undue burdens on
the government's ability to prosecute offenders because it would be
required to prove that images of child pornography were produced
with the use of actual children.'u Based on the rapid advancement
of computer technology, within a few years the computer-generated

121 See id.
i 69 F.3d 723 (5th Cir. 1995). In Kimbrough, the defendant was convicted for
receiving several depictions of child pornography by means of his computer, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A. See id. at 726-27. After being sentenced to 72 months in
prison, the defendant argued that the jury instructions given by the trial court constituted reversible error. See id. at 727, 733. Specifically, "Kimbrough argue[d] that
the Court should have instructed the jury that 'it must find Defendant knew the
producing of the depiction involved the actual use of a minor engaging in sexually
explicit conduct.'" Id. at 733.
,3 See S. REP. No. 104-358, at 17 (1996). Kimbrough had hoped that the court
would require the prosecution to prove that the images were made using actual

children. See id.
24 Kimbrough, 69 F.3d at 733.

SSeeS. RzP No. 104-358, at 16-17 (1996). The report stated: "If the government must continue to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that mailed photographs... and computer images ...are indeed actual depictions of an actual minor engaging in the sex portrayed then there could be a built-in reasonable doubt
argument in every child exploitation/pornography prosecution." Id. (footnote
omitted).
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images will be almost indistinguishable from photographs of live, actual persons.'26
Under the reasoning in Nolan and Kimbrough, however, it is the
defendant's burden to prove that the child pornography was produced without using an actual child.' The prosecution bears no
burden of proving that an actual child was exploited. If the technology is capable of producing images that appear life like to an average
juror, the defendant, not the government, will be forced to bring in
an expert to try and prove how the material was actually made.'26
Therefore, it is the defendant, and not the prosecution, who will face
the difficulty in proving that the image was computer-generated
rather than photography of an actual child.'26 As a result, the congressional purpose of protecting children has become intertwined
with the public's desire to censor nonobscene child pornography.
This censorship does not alone give rise to a compelling government
interestjustifying an intrusion on First Amendment rights. "'
12 See Weigner & Schlax, supra note 10, at 274.

See United States v. Kimbrough, 69 F.3d 723, 733 (5th Cir. 1995); United
States v. Nolan, 818 F.2d 1015, 1020 (1st Cir. 1987).
M See Nolan, 818 F.2d at 1017-18. In Nolan, the court explained that ordinary
1

people were sufficiently capable of distinguishing photographs of actual people
from "other forms of visual reproductions." Id. As a result, the court held that the
prosecution did not have to produce expert testimony in order to prove that the
visual images in question depicted an actual child. See id. at 1018-19. The factfinder is permitted to determine, just by viewing the material, whether they were
produced by photograph or by computer-generation. See id at 1017-18.
12

See id. at 1020.

10

Even as technology advances, allowing images to be created that are virtually

indistinguishable from actual photographs, courts would most likely require the defendant to bear the burden of showing that the material in issue was created without the use of an actual child or his photographed image. Cf id. at 1017-18. Because the restriction is content-based, the government, in order to survive strict
scrutiny, must show that the means chosen in the statute are the least restrictive
means available. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
Creating a rebuttable presumption that images depict actual persons provides a
less restrictive alternative to a blanket prohibition of computer generated images.
For instance, Congress could require defendants to provide sufficient evidence that
images were computer-generated and absent such a showing the jury could infer
that the child pornography was created using an actual, identifiable minor. A few
states have already taken this approach by promulgating statutes that permit the
trier of fact to infer that a person in the visual image is a minor if the material represents or depicts the participant as a minor. See, e.g., OHIo REV. CoDE ANN. §
2907.322(B)(3) (Anderson 1996); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-405(B) (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1997); TmNN. CODE AIN. § 39-17-1003(b) (1997). This permissive inference,
justified by the Supreme Court in County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140,
157 (1979), would adequately address the government's concerns without infringing on First Amendment rights. See Allen, 442 U.S. at 157 (holding that permissive
inferences do not abdicate the defendant's right to have every element of the of-
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CONGRESS'S JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE NEW AMENDMENT

In order to determine the constitutional validity of the Hatch
Amendment, the Court would have to consider whether any of Congress's purposes and motives underlying the legislation constitute a
compelling government interest.' Preventing the harms caused by
a child's participation in the production of child pornography is only
one of the declared purposes behind the federal child pornography
statutes.' 2 As previously discussed, Congress's new definition of
child pornography is not directed at protecting children from being
used to create child pornography.' "
Congress, however, has sought to prohibit computer-generated
child pornography because the government believes (1) it might
provide sexual stimulation for pedophiles and (2) is indirectly dangerous to children and harmful to the moral fabric of our society.'"
Although this rationale may be socially acceptable, this reasoning directly conflicts with the underlying values of the First Amendment.
Under the First Amendment, Congress has no authority to ban visual
images simply because they are repugnant to a majority of society or
because they may have an adverse effect on the minds of viewers.""
fense proven by the prosecution unless there is no rational way the jury could
.make the connection permitted by the inference").
1s1 See Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive
in Frst Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CjI. L. REv. 413, 414 (1996) (arguing that the
Court's First Amendment principles are intended to uncover improper legislative
motives and purposes behind legislation).
1
See S. REP. No. 104-358, at 2 (1996) (stating that the existence of computergenerated child pornography "creates the potential for many types of harm in the
community and presents a clear and present danger to all children").

See supranotes 80-83 and accompanying text.
See S. REP. No. 104-358, at 17 (1996). In his report to Congress, Senator
Hatch explained:
As discussed above, a major part of the threat to children posed by
child pornography is its effect on the viewers of such material, including child molesters and pedophiles who use such material to stimulate
or whet their own sexual appetites. To such sexual predators, the effect is the same whether the child pornography consists of photographic depictions of actual children or visual depictions produced
wholly or in part by computer. To such a viewer of child pornographic images the difference is "irrelevant because they are perceived
as minors by the psyche."
133

134

Id.

See Texas v.Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) ("If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable."); Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) ("But, above
all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content."); see also
135

1356

SETON HALL LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 28:1328

As the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has
pointed out, "Speech shielded by the [First] [A] mendment's protective wing must remain inviolate regardless of its inherent worth. The
distaste we may feel as individuals toward the content or message of
protected expression cannot, of course, detain us from discharging
our duty as guardians of the Constitution. " ""' Indeed, just because
child pornography may be socially abhorrent, the First Amendment
still guarantees free expression, unless some countervailing governmental interest outweighs this fundamental right.'"
In addition, even if computer-generated child pornography may
have socially adverse effects on its viewers' minds,' under the First
Amendment this is an area that Congress is not entitled to regulate.'
This reasoning is the centerpiece of the Court's holding in
Stanley.'44 In Stanley, Georgia argued that it could pass regulations
that protected its citizens' minds from the adverse effects of viewing
obscene materials.4 4 Rejecting this contention, Justice Marshall explained that the First Amendment guaranteed to citizens the fundamental "right to receive information and ideas, regardless of their
Martin H. Redish, First Amendment Theory and the Demise of the CommercialSpeech Distinction: The Case of the Smoking Controversy, 24 N. Ky. L. REv. 553, 562 (1997)
("However, it amounts to a nonsequitur to reason that because particular speech
causes serious harm, the speech is to be judged by a less protective standard.");
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Cheap Spirits, Cigarettes and Free Speech: The Implications of 44
Liquormart, 1996 Sup. Cr. REXv. 123, 127 ("Regulations aimed at viewpoints, subject
matters, or the communicative impact of speech on its audience get strict scrutiny,
even if the ideas aimed at are not very good or valuable ideas. .. ").
150 United States v. United States Dist. Court for the Central Dist. of
Cal., 858
F.2d 534, 541 (9th Cir. 1988).
1
See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) ("The ability of government,
consonant with the Constitution, to shut off discourse solely to protect others from
hearing it is, in other words, dependent upon a showing that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner.").
1
See Clinton, supranote 7, at 132 (claiming that pedophiles use child pornography to sexually stimulate themselves while masturbating); Tim Tate, The Child
Pornography Industry: International Trade in Child Sexual Abuse, in PORNOGRAPHY.
WOMEN, VIoLENcE AND Crvn. LiBERrms 211 (Catherine Itzin ed., 1992) (explaining
that pedophiles use child pornography to validate their feelings, to normalize their
sexual cravings, and to lower their inhibitions so that they can go out and abuse
children). But seeJohn C. Scheller, Note, PC Peep Show: Computers, Privacy, and Child
Pornography,27J. MAmSH-ALi L. Rzv. 989, 996 n.47 (1994) (expressing the alternative
view that using child pornography helps pedophiles and is a "healthy expression of
repressed feeling and fantasy and helps people to become more comfortable with
their sexuality").
1
See Kent & Truesdell, supra note 85, at 386 n.121 (arguing that the government cannot prohibit pornography in order to train people to hold socially acceptable views).
140 SeeStanleyv. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 563-65 (1969).
'41

See id. at 565.
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social worth" and "to satisfy [their] intellectual and emotional needs
in the privacy of [their] own home[s]." 2
The Supreme Court adhered to this reasoning again in Osborne
when it permitted the states to proscribe the possession of child
pornography as long as the purpose of the restriction was not to
regulate people's minds." ' Prohibiting computer-generated child
pornography in order to control people's sexual feelings and
thoughts would contravene the purposes and philosophy behind the
First Amendment.'" Even if viewers use child pornography for sexual stimulation, this activity alone does not establish a compelling
government interest in prohibiting the material. In United States v.
Wiegand,"' the Ninth Circuit stated: "The crime punished by the
statutes against the sexual exploitation of children, however, does
not consist in the cravings of the person posing the child or in the
cravings of his audience. Private fantasies are not within the statute's
ambit."'" Therefore, Congress cannot defend its unconstitutional
broadening of the coverage of the federal child pornography statute
based on its attempts to control the "sexual appetites" of pedophiles
and other viewers.14'
Furthermore, Congress cannot ban the possession of computergenerated child pornography simply because the material may cause
the viewer to act out his fantasies and molest or abuse a child.'" The
causal link between the proposition that those who view child pornography will ultimately abuse a child is too attenuated.'" In Stanley,
the Court rejected the state's argument that the viewing of obscene
images had a tendency to cause its viewers to commit unlawful sexual
1
acts. '

'4 Id. at 564, 565; see also GORDON HAWKiS & FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, PORNOGRAPHY
IN A FREE Sociay 178 (1988) (emphasizing that pedophiles may not be the only

members of society who use child pornography to become sexually aroused).
143 See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 109
(1990).

I" See Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565 ("Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the

thought of giving government the power to control men's minds.").
145 812 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1987).
146 Weigand, 812 F.2d at 1245.
SSeeS. REP. No. 104-358, at 17 (1996).
14
Cf Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
('Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech").
49 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). Under the Court's "clear
and present danger" test, speech cannot be prohibited or punished because of its
dangerous propensity unless the potential harm is intended, imminent, and likely
to occur. See id.

ISOSee Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 566-67 (1969) ("[T]he State may no
more prohibit mere possession of obscene matter on the ground that it may lead to
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit re5 ' In
jected a similar argument in American Bookselkrs Ass'n v. Hudnut.'
Hudnu, the Seventh Circuit struck down an ordinance that prohibited the trafficking of nonobscene materials that depicted the
graphic, sexually explicit subordination of women." 2 The city defended the statute, claiming that it was necessary to eliminate the
male tendency "to view women as sexual objects;" the city alleged
that this created unacceptable attitudes, discrimination, and violence
towards women.'" Even after accepting this premise, the Seventh
Circuit declared the law to be aimed at "thought control" and, therefore, inconsistent with the First Amendment.'" Even if the exposure
to computer-generated child pornography leads viewers to act out
against children, the government should punish the harmful conduct and not the ideas or expressive materials that lead up to the
behavior.'5
Somewhat more persuasively, Congress has explained that the
purpose behind its ban on computer-generated child pornography is
to prevent pedophiles from using child pornography to seduce children into performing sexual acts or posing for child pornography.'"
antisocial conduct than it may prohibit possession of chemistry books on the
ground that they may lead to the manufacture of homemade spirits.").
151 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985).
152 See Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 324, 332.
The statute defined trafficking as the
"production, sale, exhibition or distribution of pornography" and defined pornography as sexually explicit material, encompassing much more material than the
Millerstandard of obscenity. Id. Furthermore, victims of physical assaults precipitated by the attacker having previously viewed pornography had a cause of action
against the seller, exhibitor, or distributor of the material. See id. at 325.
15 See id. at 325.
1 See id. at 328, 329, 332.
15 See Stanley, 394 U.S. at 566-67 ("[I]n the context of private consumption of
ideas and information we should adhere to the view that '[a]mong free men, the
deterrents ordinarily to be applied to prevent crime are education and punishment
for violations of the law . .. .'") (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 378
(1927) (Brandeis,J., concurring)).
1 SeeS. REP. No. 104-358, at 13-14 (1996). Relying on testimony given by a few
child pornography experts, Senator Hatch reasoned:
A child who may be reluctant to engage in sexual activity with an
adult, or to pose for sexually explicit photos, can sometimes be persuaded to do so by viewing depictions of other children participating
in such activity. Child molesters and pedophiles use child pornography to convince potential victims that the depicted sexual activity is a
normal practice; that other children regularly participate in sexual activities with adults or peers.
Id.; see also Clinton, supra note 7, at 132-33 (describing the process by which pedophiles use child pornography to entice children into performing sexual acts); Liz
Kelly, Pornography and Child Sexual Abuse, in PoRNocawi.i-w WOMEN, VOIEic AND
CIviL LmTIaRizs 119 (Catherine Itzin ed., 1992) (explaining that pedophiles use
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Senator Hatch further explained that, because computer technology
will soon be able to generate visual images that are indistinguishable
from photographs of live events, computer-generated child pornography will be just as effective at luring children as real photographic
images 3'In dicta, the Osborne Court intimated that prohibiting the possession of child pornography benefited society because evidence
suggested that pedophiles use child pornography to entice children
into performing harmful sexual acts.'50 The Osborne court accepted
this proposition based on the Attorney General's Final Report on
Pornography, which merely stated that "[c ] hild pornography is often
used as part of a method of seducing child victims. " '" This report
did not contain any empirical evidence to support such a finding,
but rather, was based on general assertions regarding the behavioral
patterns of pedophiles.'60
Of course, it may be true that many pedophiles possess some
form of child pornographic
•
61
r material and may even use such material
to seduce their victims. 61 It does not follow, however, that all possessors of sexually explicit depictions of children are pedophiles who
use the material to seduce children into performing sexual acts.'
Although Congress may have good intentions-protecting children
from being subjected to molestation and other forms of sexual
abuse-this objective should not be furthered at the expense of infringing on others' First Amendment rights. Computer-generated
child pornography is speech and expression in its purest form;
therefore, the government's interest in prohibiting that expression
must be compelling and the means chosen must be the least restrictive.' Even though protecting children from sexual abuse is a comchild pornography to sexually arouse their child victims and to persuade them that

theiwill enjoy participating in the requested sexual activities).
SeeS. REP. No. 104-358, at 16 (1996).
I See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990).

19 See ATrORNEY GEN. COMM. ON PORNOGRAPHY, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, FIAL
REPORT 649 (1986).
160 S id.
161 See Adam W. Smith, Casenote, Taking Ferber a Step Further: Stanley Loses in the

Battle Against Child Porwgraphy, 14 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 157, 166 n.74 (1987) (citing
GO.DSrEIN, supra note 2, at 135-38).
M6
But seeJosephine R. Potuto, Stanley + Ferber - The ConstitutionalCrim of At-

Home Child PornographyPossession, 76 Ky. LJ. 15, 55 (1988) (arguing that very few
possessors of child pornography have it merely to possess and view).
1
Pure speech, as opposed to symbolic speech, is fully protected by the First
Amendment. See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557-58
(1975) (holding that even the exhibition of a play that "mixes speech with live action or conduct" does not justify the use of a less stringent standard of review).

1360

SETON HALL LA W REVEW

[Vol. 28:1328

pelling governmental interest, prohibiting the creation and possession of computer-generated child pornography is not the least restrictive means of achieving that objective.
To satisfy such a burden, Congress, at a minimum, must provide
some substantial, empirical evidence to demonstrate that the prohibited material's only purpose is to seduce children into participating
in sexual activity.'" In addition, the possession of purely communicative, nonobscene material is granted full First Amendment protection even though it could be used unlawfully or to achieve illegal
ends."' Although mere possession of materials may be proscribed in
limited instances, the government must demonstrate in those cases
that the material has no other purpose.'"
These computergenerated images are produced without harming, abusing, or sexually exploiting children in any way. The material's potential for illegal use alone should not remove it from the protective shield of the
First Amendment.""
Moreover, the government has other less restrictive ways of protecting children without prohibiting the possession and creation of
computer-generated sexual material. Coercing a child to perform
sexual acts or to pose in sexually explicit ways is prohibited in every
state and by federal law.'" In addition, most states have criminalized
the distribution of sexually explicit materials to minors."19 Also, if the
Government suppression of symbolic speech, which the Court has defined as nonverbal conduct that contains some expressive elements, is subject to an intermediate
level of First Amendment scrutiny. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406-07
(1989) (flag burning); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (draft
card burning). Expression such as writing, drawing, or creating visual images via
computer are types of pure speech that may only be restricted if the regulation survives strict scrutiny. SeeJohnson, 491 U.S. at 406.
164 There is no evidence to show that pedophiles only or mainly use child
pornography to seduce children. Many pedophiles use other materials to entice their
victims such as adult pornography, money, candy, and other types of gifts. See Potuto, supra note 162, at 28; see alsoS. REP. No. 95-438, at 9 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 46 ("An offer of money, food, or shelter, or even a few friendly words
or a show of concern can lead [children], unquestioning, into the hands of exploiters for purposes of pornography or prostitution.").
1
See Quigley, supra note 28, at 363-64 (stating that the government does not
have the power to prohibit the possession of every material that might be used for
an illegal purpose, especially where the material consists of purely speech).
106 eid.
167 See United States v. Villard, 700 F. Supp. 803, 812 (D.NJ. 1988) ("When a picture does not constitute child pornography,.. . it does not become child pornography because it is placed in the hands of a pedophile, or in a forum where pedophiles might enjoy it.").
168 Se 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (West Supp. HI 1986).
16g See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968) (holding that the First
Amendment does not prohibit the government from outlawing the distribution of
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computer-generated images are sufficiently graphic, state and federal
obscenity laws will prohibit the images altogether. These alternative
means are equally effective at protecting children from sexual abuse
without infringing the First Amendment right to possess sexually explicit images of children that are created without harming an actual
child."0 In order to protect children and the Constitution, Congress
should be more concerned with punishing those who actually sexually abuse children rather than7 those who merely possess computergenerated child pornography. '
The Hatch Amendment goes beyond its stated purpose because
it hinders art as well as pedophiles. Many serious artistic, scientific,
and educational materials involve and contain sexually explicit depictions of children."' The child pornography statute proscribes
nonobscene and obscene images; thus, serious works may fall within
the prohibitions of child pornography if they are deemed to be
"sexually explicit," a very amorphous term.1'

In Ferber, the Court stated that, if the portrayal of a child in a
sexually explicit manner was necessary for a serious artistic, scientific,
or educational work, a person over the statutory age or some other
simulation could be utilized to achieve that effect.' The use of an
sexually explicit materials to minors). Some states have specifically criminalized the
dissemination, by computer, of information about or to a minor that is intended to
solicit sexual conduct with a minor or solicit visual depictions of such sexual conduct. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. Am. § 847.0135(2) (d) (West 1994). In addition, Congress has passed the Communications Decency Act, which prohibits a person from
knowingly using the Internet to provide a child with sexually explicit material. See
47 U.S.C.A. § 223(d) (West Supp. 1998). Although the Court struck this Act down
as unconstitutional in Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2350 (1997), the decision
rested on the vagueness of the term "indecent material" and the burdensome effect
it would have on adults' rights to access these protected materials. See Rent, 117 S.
Ct. at 2346, 2350. The decision clearly does not prevent Congress from prohibiting
the distribution of sexually explicit materials to minors through the Internet.
170 See Potuto, supra note 162, at 27 ("A focus on potentially causative harmful
impact is simply insufficient justification to override the Stanley first amendment
concerns.").
1
See Quigley, supra note 28, at 365.
17
See Child PornographyPreventionAct of 1995: Hearings on S. 1237 Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 46, 47-48 (1996) (statement of Judith F. Krug,
Director of the American Library Association's Office for Intellectual Freedom
(ALA-OEF)) (stating that many critically acclaimed movies such as Romeo and Juliet
and The Last PictureShow and many famous visual works from artists such as Picasso
and Leonardo would be illegal under the new changes to the child pornography
statute).
11S See, e.g., United States v. Knox, 32 F.3d 733, 745 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that

the term "sexually explicit" means lewd or lascivious and does not require the child
in the material to be fully or even partially nude).
14

See NewYork v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 762-63 (1982).
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adult model, even one who appears to be a minor, has been recognized as a legal alternative to the use of a child for the production of
sexually explicit material.7 In X-Citement Video, the Court concluded
that the subject's age was an essential element of the offense.'7
Therefore, if the subject of the visual depiction is determined to be
over the age of majority, the nonobscene material retains full First
Amendment protection.'
The new changes to the federal child pornography statute have
now made this alternative unavailable. Child pornography is now defined as a visual depiction that is, or appears to be, of a minor." ' A
strict reading of this statute would even prohibit the use of an adult
to portray realistically a minor in sexually explicit material." Congress attempted to create an exception for such material in 18 U.S.C.
§ 2252A by specifically exempting from coverage visual images that
are created by using an actual adult to portray a minor. 8° This provision, however, prohibits the creator of such images from presenting
the material in any manner that conveys the impression that it contains a depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.'
This exception effectively swallows up the availability of the exemption. An artist can use an adult to portray a child engaging in
17 See id.
176 See United States v. X-Citement Video,
Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 72-73 (1994).
177 Seeid. at
72.
18 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2256(8)
(B) (West Supp. 1998).
17
For instance, the movie Lolita, based on a famous book, opened in Europe
in
1997, but was not released in any American theaters presumably because the story is
about a man who is sexually obsessed with an underage girl. SeeJoan E. Bertin, Pornography Law Goes Too Far,L.A. TImES, Oct. 17, 1997, at B9. Although this film has
been artistically acclaimed, many believe that the film has not been exhibited in
America due to fears of prosecution under the new federal child pornography statute, even though an adult plays the minor child in the film. See id. (voicing the belief that the mere viewing of child pornography does not cause the sexual abuse and
exploitation of children).
IS See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252A (West 1998). The statute states:
(c) It shall be an affirmative defense to a charge of violating paragraphs (1), (2), (3), or (4) of subsection (a) that(1) the alleged child pornography was produced using an actual person or persons engaging in sexually explicit conduct;
(2) each such person was an adult at the time the material was
produced; and
(3) the defendant did not advertise, promote, present, describe, or distribute the material in such a manner as to convey
the impression that it is or contains a visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.
Id.
"' See id.
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sexually explicit conduct, but the material cannot be presented in a
realistic way so that the viewer would think that a child is being depicted.'" The effect of these changes will inevitably cause artists and
other image creators to censor themselves and avoid using previously
acceptable
methods of depicting minors in sexually explicit materis

als.'

CONCLUSION

By prohibiting computer-generated images that appear to be of
a child, Congress is attempting to do more than just protect the
children victimized by participation in the child pornography industry. Through such a prohibition, Congress has sought to protect society from the evils believed to be inherent in the possession and future use of these computer-generated sexually explicit materials.
Congress's sole and primary purpose in passing statutes banning
child pornography is, and should be, to prevent children from suffering the harms linked to their participation in child pornography--not to protect society as a whole.' Although this desire to
Pursuant to the Court's holding in X-Citement Video, it is unlikely that this pordon of the Hatch Amendment would withstand constitutional scrutiny. Cf. XCitement Video, 513 U.S. at 72. In X-Citement Video, the Court explicitly stated that
.sexually explicit conduct involving persons over the age of 17 are protected by the
First Amendment." Id. The clear implication to draw from the Court's holding is
that sexually explicit materials produced using adult participants is constitutionally
protected regardless of whether they were intended to give the impression that a
child was being depicted.
183 See ChildPornographyPreventionAct of 1995: Hearingson
S. 1237 Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 46, 50 (1996) (statement of Judith F. Krug, Director of ALA-OIF) (arguing that the new changes would effectively cause libraries
to suppress certain works that depict children, even if adults are used to portray
them). For example, in June 1997, an Oklahoma state judge deemed the Oscarwinning film Tin-Drum, which eludes to a sexual encounter between two minors,
illegal under the new child pornography laws and ordered police to remove copies
of the film from local video stores. SeeJoe Holleman, Webster Series Picks up Controversial Tin-Drum': Oscar-Winnerin '79 Faced Recent PornographyProtest,ST. Louis PosrDISPATCH, Oct. 16, 1997, at 3G. Pursuant to a lawsuit filed by the ACLU, a federal
judge issued an injunction mandating the police to return the seized copies of the
film. See Judge Rules Oklahoma Vldeo Seizure Unconstitutiona ACLU NEws WnM (Dec.
29, 1997) <http://www.aclu.org/news/w122997a.html>. Although the judge did
not rule on the constitutionality of the new child pornography statute, the court
held that the police's ex parte seizure violated the First Amendment. See id.
184 Federal courts have consistently held that the purpose of
the child pornography statutes is to protect children from victimization and not to protect society as a
whole. For instance, in both United States v. Ketcham, 80 F.3d 789, 793 (3d Cir.
1996) and United Statesv. Kirkland,No. 96-9152, 1997 WL 76211, at*3 (6th Cir. Feb.
20, 1997), the United States Court of Appeals for the Third and Sixth Circuits considered the United States Sentencing Guidelines and how they should be applied to
18
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protect society is no doubt genuine, the resulting censorship is impermissible.
What this Note attempts to demonstrate with respect to computer-generated child pornography is the likelihood that, under the
new changes to the federal child pornography statutes, mere creators
and possessors of inherently harmless, expressive material will be
subject to criminal punishment. Moreover, the lasting effect of such
a prohibition will deter artists and other image creators from producing serious works that portray minors in sexually explicit ways.
This type of governmental suppression, and correlative self censorship, is precisely what the First Amendment should prevent. Therefore, unless there is some strong, empirical proof that the existence
of computer-generated child pornography is directly injurious to the
overall well being of our youth, there is no satisfactory justification
for such a clear infringement of our constitutional guarantees.
Vincent Lodato

convictions under the federal child pornography statutes. See Kirkland, 1997 WL
76211, at *3; Ketcham, 80 F.3d at 793. The defendants in these cases unsuccessfully
argued that society was the primary intended victim to be protected by 18 U.S.C. §
2252. See Kirkland, 1997 WL 76211, at *3; Ketcham, 80 F.3d at 792, 793. In rejecting
the argument, both courts determined that for sentencing purposes, the primary
objective behind 18 U.S.C. § 2252 was not to protect society but "to protect children
from the exploitation by producers of child pornography." Ketcham, 80 F.3d at 793;
see also Kirkland, 1997 WL 76211, at *3. In addition, these courts implied that if the
articles of child pornography were images of the same child victim, grouping offenses for sentencing would then have been appropriate. See Kirkland, 1997 WL
76211, at *2; Ketcham, 80 F.3d at 792.

